Research institutes NWO: knowledge security screening law undermines Dutch research climate
The NWO Institutes are concerned about the content of the draft bill on knowledge security screening in its current form. The ten research institutes foresee problems with the feasibility of the bill and the additional regulatory burden it will entail. The bill will also lead to a deterioration of the Dutch research climate, making our country less attractive to scarce talent, which we urgently need. In their response to the internet consultation, the NWO Institutes express their concerns about the disproportionate nature of the bill. Other knowledge institutions have similar objections.
Knowledge security
The proposed Knowledge Security Screening Act, which is currently undergoing public consultation, is an extension of the current knowledge security policy described in the National Knowledge Security Guidelines. Under this policy, knowledge institutions and the government work together to protect knowledge where necessary. The joint approach has been successful and is seen as an example by like-minded countries.
The new Knowledge Security Screening Bill introduces mandatory screening by the government for persons who come into contact with sensitive technologies (technologies with applications in vital processes or defense, investigation, intelligence, or security services) at a knowledge institution. This screening is in addition to the current policy for secure recruitment and selection within the National Knowledge Security Guidelines. However, the NWO Institutes are concerned about the form and scope of the bill.
Questions about effectiveness
Although the research institutes are aware of the importance of protecting national security and preventing undesirable applications by preventing the undesirable transfer of knowledge and technology, the NWO institutes have questions about the effectiveness of the current bill.
The proposal is only aimed at potentially preventing undesirable knowledge transfer through screening prior to, for example, employment. This does not prevent undesirable knowledge transfer during or after employment. This makes the intensive screening of the expected total number of screenings (from 8,000 to 10,000 researchers across the entire Dutch knowledge field) disproportionate.
Scarce talent
The law also worsens the research climate in the Netherlands. World-class research can only take place in an environment where new insights and different perspectives are guaranteed. That is precisely why the free international exchange of talent is a crucial success factor for Dutch research.
The amount of personal information requested from potential researchers who want to come to the Netherlands can have a deterrent effect. This puts Dutch research at a disadvantage.
Furthermore, the law could damage the Netherlands' position in international partnerships, as Dutch knowledge institutions, including the NWO institutes, will be restricted in their exchange and cooperation with foreign knowledge institutions. Screening researchers in all partnerships involving sensitive technology makes the Netherlands a less attractive partner in international collaborations and less attractive as a location for international scientific infrastructures.
Feasibility and regulatory burden
Another major concern is the feasibility of the screening. Expanding the target group from non-EU citizens to everyone means that many more screenings will have to be carried out than previously expected. The broad definition of sensitive technology also means that the screening will apply in many places.
The bill states that knowledge institutions must shield sensitive technologies within their organizations; this would mean that screening would only apply to people who have access to the relevant part of the organization. This compartmentalization requires very radical changes to, among other things, the buildings, laboratories, and digital systems of the NWO Institutes, which will require major investments. It is expected that this physical and digital separation will not be possible everywhere, which will mean that screening will also apply to the wider organization, resulting in more screenings.
A large number of screenings will create a heavy administrative burden (more administration and registration and the establishment of new processes for recruiting staff) for the NWO institutes and the government itself, and could lead to long lead times. Long lead times cause stagnation in the recruitment process, leaving potential employees in limbo for longer and increasing the likelihood of them dropping out prematurely. This is undesirable for both the candidates and the institutes.
Alternatives
The NWO-I response also discusses a number of proposals to make the law more workable. These include proposals to clarify the definitions and application of the law (including a clearly defined assessment framework), a lower limit on the maximum duration, and greater European coordination.
Would you like to know more about the response of the NWO Institutes and the recommendations to the government? Read the response to the internet consultation (in Dutch).